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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the mobile device has become a 
ubiquitous tool within everyday life. Unfortunately, whilst 
the popularity of mobile devices has increased, a 
corresponding increase can also be identified in the 
threats being targeted towards these devices. Security 
countermeasures such as AV and firewalls are being 
deployed; however, the increasing sophistication of the 
attacks requires additional measures to be taken. This 
paper proposes a novel behaviour-based profiling 
technique that is able to build upon the weaknesses of 
current systems by developing a comprehensive multi-
level approach to profiling. In support of this model, a 
series of experiments have been designed to look at 
profiling calling, device usage and Bluetooth network 
scanning. Using neural networks, experimental results for 
the aforementioned activities’ are able to achieve an EER 




Over the last decade, the mobile device has changed 
significantly; becoming a multimedia and multi-
functional device. The mobile telephone alone, a subset of 
the mobile devices, has over 4.1 billion subscribers 
around the world. The modern mobile device is capable of 
providing a wide range of services over several network 
connections on a continual basis. As a result, many people 
rely upon these services and information to complete their 
business and personal tasks. Such tasks can include 
accessing email via a wireless network, online shopping 
through a 3G network, sharing pictures over a Bluetooth 
connection, and reading documents. The nature of many 
of these activities is likely to be either personally or 
corporately sensitive.  
While people enjoy the convenience and pleasure the 
mobile device provides, it can also bring several security 
concerns, such as service fraud, lost or stolen handsets, 
SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card cloning [1], 
malware, information disclosure, and Denial of Service 
(DoS) [2]. For the malware alone, although it was 
discovered a few years ago, the number of incidents is 
growing significantly every year. For instance, Kaspersky 
have already identified a total number of 106 mobile 
malware families with 514 modifications since 2004 [3].  
To counter these security threats, various mobile 
security solutions have been proposed and developed in 
the area of authentication, firewalls and antivirus. 
However, given the increasing sophistication of the 
threats, additional countermeasures present in the desktop 
environment are being considered for use on a mobile 
device. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are one such 
technology. Unfortunately, the current nature of IDSs 
deployed within the desktop environment is significantly 
different to the mobile environment, with differing 
stakeholders, requirements and capabilities. In addition, 
research to date in the area of mobile IDS has been 
limited to identifying specific threats rather than taking a 
comprehensive approach [4]. This paper focuses upon 
presenting the findings from a feasibility study into 
utilising behavioural profiling to successfully identify 
mobile device misuse. 
This paper begins by introducing the threats associated 
with a mobile device, and general security controls. 
Section 2 identifies the key research completed to date. 
Section 3, presents the methodology for a series of 
experimental studies on three aspects of mobile user’s 
behaviours: telephony, device usage, and Bluetooth 
scanning. The results from the experiments are presented 
along with the discussion in section 4. The paper then 
proceeds to propose a Host-based Multi-Level Behaviour 
Profiling Mobile IDS framework. The paper concludes 
with highlighting the future work.  
 
2. Mobile Intrusion Detection System 
 
The IDS is an established research area for more than 
20 years. There is extensive research on computer-based 
IDSs, but limited emphasis has been given so far on 
mobile IDSs. So, the focus of this section is to review 
existing research on mobile IDS: namely behaviour-based 
and signature-based IDSs. 
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2.1. Behaviour Based Mobile IDS 
 
The research for mobile IDS started around 1995 with 
preliminary focus upon detecting telephony service fraud. 
By monitoring users’ calling behaviour and migration 
activity, the aforementioned attack can be detected.  
The telephony based mobile IDS monitors user’s 
calling features (e.g. start time of call, duration of call, 
dialled telephone number and national or international 
call). By using the combination of these features, a 
historical profile is acquired. Any deviation between the 
current calling session and the historical profile that 
exceeds a threshold, is identified as an intrusion. Several 
studies were proposed by using this procedure, such as the 
European ASPECT (Advanced Security for Personal 
Communication Technologies) project [5], [6], and [7]. 
Migration based mobile IDS monitors the mobile 
user’s migration activities through mobile cell networks. 
By profiling a mobile user’s migration mobility or 
migration itinerary activities, telephony service frauds 
could be detected. A number of studies have been carried 
out by using users’ migration activity: [8-9] employed 
user’s mobility, and [10] used user’s migration itinerary.  
In generally, behaviour based mobile IDS has an 
average high detection rate; also, as the detection process 
is carried out by the network operator, there is no 
overhead for the mobile device. On the other hand, as the 
mobile device has changed significantly, the network 
operator could not monitor all the behaviour any more 
such as Internet surfing over WiFi networks. 
 
2.2. Signature Based Mobile IDS 
 
It is widely recognised that the battery plays a key role 
in a mobile device. Attacking the battery is a major threat 
for the mobile device’s availability; as the battery runs 
out, the device becomes unusable. In order to counter 
battery consumption as a result of security threats, such as 
malware and DoS, several studies on signature based 
mobile IDS have been conducted: such as, Power Secure 
Architecture [11], and Gibraltar [12]. They work in a 
similar fashion: each mobile application consumes unique 
power and so does the malware. As a result, by analysing 
battery activities, attacking signatures can be obtained. By 
comparing the current battery status with attacking 
signatures, any matches will be identified as an intrusion.   
The advantage for the signature based mobile IDS is it 
has a low false alarm rate and meaningful descriptions for 
the intrusion. However, obtaining mobile malware’s 
signatures can be a difficult task; furthermore, it can not 
provide detection for service related attacks such as 
abusing the telephony service or data modification on the 
mobile device. 
 
2.3. Summary Of Current Mobile IDS 
 
From the aforementioned literature, it suggests that the 
behaviour based mobile IDS is able to detect telephony 
service fraud attacks and the signature based mobile IDS 
can identify possible malware and DoS attacks. However, 
in practice it can be seen that the calling and migration 
behaviours were monitored by a single network provider, 
rather than being host-based, and the signature based 
mobile IDSs have limited signatures in the database and 
thus cannot provide much detection for user related 
activities. In addition, as increased functionality, usability 
and compatibility, users are now experiencing a far larger 
set of mobile activities illustrated in the last column of 
Table 1. Therefore none of the current research in mobile 
IDS truly provides a compressive protection against 
device misuse independent of service or application being 
used. As a result, a mobile IDS which can offer the 
detection for a wider range of services and connections on 
the mobile device is certainly needed. 
 
Table 1.  Taxonomy of mobile usage 
Category Behaviours Examples 
Application 
level 
Telephony Call a friend 
Text Send greeting through SMS
MMS Send picture through MMS
File access Write and save a document 
Data Create a copy of work data




Bluetooth Share picture  
Wi-Fi Connect to a Wi-Fi network
Machine 
level 
CPU 16% CPU is in use
Memory 12M Memory is allocated
Battery An application consumes 1% 
of the battery  
 
3. Feasibility of host-based Behavioural 
Profiling 
 
When looking to develop an IDS for a mobile device, 
the traditional network-based approaches are infeasible 
given the various networking technologies a single device 
is able to use and the differing stakeholders that own 
them. Therefore a host-based approach must be 
considered. Given the difficulty of establishing signatures 
in the first instance [12], and their inability to detect 
unknown attacks, a profiling was taken. However, little 
literature to date has tested the discriminative nature of 
service utilisation. Building upon the taxonomy identity in 
Table 1, a series of experiments have been conducted 
within each category or level: application, network and 
machine. 
 
3.1. Experimental Procedure 
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An MIT Reality dataset was utilised. The dataset 
contained 94 participants’ mobile device activities 
recorded from September 2004 to June 2005 [13]. The 
data was collected from the Nokia 6600 phone which was 
preinstalled with automatic logging software.  
 
Table 2.  The MIT Reality dataset 
Activity Number 
Of Logs 
Information Contains  




1994186 Date, time of each scan along and 
individual device’s MAC address 




574788 Date and time the mobile has been 
in use 
On  13012 Date and time when the phone is 
turned on 
SMS 5607 Date, time and number of texting
Voice 54440 Date, time, number of calling and 
duration 
 
As shown in Table 2, the dataset contains a rich 
volume of information which covers all the levels of 
mobile device usage. The experiment analysed the 
telephony, device usage, and Bluetooth scan activities; as 
representative of application level, machine, and network 
levels.  
Telephony service was the first service invented for the 
mobile device. People use it to communicate with other 
people over a voice channel. The telephony service still 
dominates the mobile market along with increasing 
revenues across the globe [14]. The prior literature shows 
that the calling behaviour has been studied a number of 
times over the telecommunication service provider’s 
network environment and it can be used to discriminate 
users. However, within the mobile host environment, the 
calling features have changed slightly, such as the IMSI 
can not be utilised anymore. Hence, it is important to 
establish whether the calling features still remain a 
positive attribute that can be used within a host-based 
environment.  
Once the mobile device is in use, it becomes active; 
otherwise it may be either idle or switched off. When the 
mobile device is in the active mode, the following three 
scenarios would happen: a) the user views whatever 
information appears on the home screen, but does not 
interact with any applications; b) the user utilises one 
application, then sends the device to idle mode; c) the 
user uses more than one application to perform a task over 
one active session. For example, the user takes a 
photograph, views it, and emails it to a friend over a Wi-
Fi connection. Whilst the example shows that the user 
utilises at least three applications to perform one big task 
over an active session, this particular experiment is 
simply focussed upon whether the device is in use and 
how unique and discriminative this information is. 
Bluetooth is one of the short range networking 
technologies employed by the mobile device to 
communicate with nearby Bluetooth enabled devices. In 
order to do this, the mobile device has to scan nearby 
Bluetooth enabled device. Each scan may come up with a 
list of devices. Each device has a unique MAC address. 
Given the nature of a Personal Area Network (PAN) 
certain Bluetooth MAC address(es) may keep showing up 
on the scan list. For example, a user has a Bluetooth 
enabled headset, so its MAC address should appear on the 
Bluetooth scan list. Therefore it is possible to hypothesise, 
that a mobile device will encounter a familiar set of MAC 
addresses during normal activity – particularly within 
home and work environments. By learning those familiar 
Bluetooth MAC addresses, certain locations and potential 
trust can be established.  
For data processing reasons, the experiment employed 
the first 30 users’ activities over the first 10-month period. 
For each experiment however, only one month’s activities 
were extracted for each individual activity in order to 
minimise any resulting inaccuracy, as it is likely that 
user’s behaviour could change over time [15]. Template 
renewal or refresh is something that will be tackled once 
the feasibility of such an approach is proven. A series of 
iterative experiments were conducted across the three 
activities and complete time period. 
 




Table 3 shows the experimental results for the first 30 
users one month’s calling behaviour. Five calling features 
were utilised: the calling number, the day of calling, the 
time of calling, the duration of the conversation, and the 
weekday. The weekday feature was calculated by using 
the day feature; as people’s activity on different weekdays 
could be different [4] [12]. A Radial Basis Network 
(RBF) was utilised in favour of other approaches given its 
previous success in [4] [7]. The configuration of which 
was iteratively modified to optimise performance. By 
using all five features, the best average Equal Error Rate 
(EER) achieved is 15.6% and it was achieved by using 
150 neurons. Apart from the calling number, every other 
feature was removed from the neural network 
configuration in turn to understand the value that feature 
had upon performance. The best average EER was 13.5% 
and this was achieved by using 125 neurons with number 
of calling, the day, weekday, and duration. By using 
number of calling, time of calling, weekday and duration, 
the system got the highest average EER of 17.7%. 
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Table 3.  Experimental result on calling  




150 Number, day, time, week, 
duration  
15.6% 0%
130 Number, time, week, 
duration 
17.7% 7.1%
125 Number, day, week, 
duration  
13.5% 0%
135 Number, day, time, duration 13.6% 0%
140 Number, day, time, week 15.4% 0%
 
As shown in Table 3, the overall result for calling 
behaviour is positive – remembering the nature of this 
type of profiling is unlikely to result in EER in the same 
order of magnitude as physiological biometrics. As the 
number of features decreases, the number of required 
neurons also decreases; indicating that proper selection of 
the strong and positive features would save a significant 
amount of computing power. This is especially important 
in the mobile device environment: fast, accurate detection 
by using minimal computer power.    
 
4.2. Device Usage  
 
The device usage behaviour study also employed the 
first 30 users’ information from the MIT Reality dataset. 
For the active behaviour, the following features were 
extracted from the dataset: the day, time, duration and 
weekday. Within table 4, the best average EER is 35.1% 
and this was achieved by using 5 neurons with the time, 
day, duration and weekday. The best individual user EER 
is 1% by using 7 neurons in the RBF neural network with 
the day, duration and weekday features. Interestingly, 
with the same neuron network configuration, 43% of the 
whole population achieved less than 30% of the EER, 
although majority of them have an EER in the region of 
20%-30%. 
 
Table 4.  Experimental results on active 







5 Time, day, 
duration, 
weekday 
35.1% 3.87% 36.7% 
7 Time, day, 
duration 
35.8% 3.82% 40% 
7 Day, duration, 
weekday 
36.2% 1% 43%




As there is no indication that what purpose the device 
has been used for, only knowing a usage occurred, the 
usability for distinct mobile users reduces significantly. 
However, this could be improved by knowing what has 
happened during the active duration: such as, one text 
message was sent. Moreover, the result does indicate that 
device usage can be used for identifying a subset from the 
entire mobile population; as at least 1/3 of the users have 
an EER rate less than 30%. 
 
4.3. Bluetooth Scan 
 
As the mobile device’s Bluetooth scan performs 
passively every 5 minutes, a huge amount of information 
was available for processing. Given the repeated nature of 
the scans, samples may keep reappearing if the user stays 
in one location for a while, for example watching a film in 
the cinema or taking a lecture in the classroom. As a 
result, the experiment employed the first 30 users’ 
Bluetooth scans which performed at 10 o’clock each day. 
However, due to the aforementioned restriction, only the 
MAC address, the day, and the week features were 
extracted from the sub dataset. Table 5 describes the 
experimental result on the Bluetooth scanning activities. 
By using 20 neurons with the MAC address and the day 
as the inputs, the RBF neural network achieved the best 
average EER of 35.7%. By using the same configuration, 
30% of the experiment users have less than 30% EER. 
For the best individual user’s EER, 0% was achieved in 
both RBF neural configurations. 
 
Table 5.  Experimental results on Bluetooth scanning 







15 MAC address, 
day, week 
36.1% 0% 26.7% 
20 MAC address, day 35.7% 0% 30% 
 
Table 5 does show a positive set of results from 
Bluetooth scan behaviour, although the result is a little bit 
noisy. It may cause by the nature of Bluetooth scan 
behaviour, as the content of a Bluetooth scan list heavily 
relies on other Bluetooth enable devices. For example, in 
an office environment, a mobile user’s Bluetooth scan list 
may contain colleagues’ Bluetooth enabled device and a 
number Bluetooth enabled desktop PCs; as the colleagues 
come in and out the office, the user’s Bluetooth scan list 
will change accordingly. The scan list may change 
slightly but within a familiar set of MAC addresses. Also, 
the experimental results show that a proportion of users’ 
Bluetooth scanning behaviour are quite predictable as 
30% of them have an EER less than 30%.    
From the above three experiments, the positive results 
identify that the calling, device usage and Bluetooth 
scanning behaviours used to profile mobile users. 
However, the level of performance is such that no single 
feature could be utilised to make decisions over misuse – 
the inconvenience of being wrongly identified would be 
too high. This suggests that a new mobile IDS could have 
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a behaviour selector for each individual user to choose 
correct behaviour accordingly. Moreover, it can also be 
seen that the individual user’s performance with each 
activity differs – thereby suggesting that an IDS system 
capable of weighting the input features on an individual 
user basis would be better suited to optimising overall 
performance. Finally, whilst individual results will go 
someway in understanding the legitimacy of a user, the 
combination or fusion of multiple inputs would only serve 
to support the decision making process [16, 17]. 
 
5. Host Based Multi-level Behaviour Profiling 
Mobile IDS Framework 
 
With the aim of providing accurate and robust 
detection of misuse, a proposed framework is presented in 
Figure 1. The Host-based Multi-level Behaviour Profiling 
Mobile IDS framework is capable of processing multiple 
user activities from all levels of the taxonomy identified 
in Table 1 and intelligently interpreting the results to 
provide a more robust decision making process. 
As shown in Figure 1, all the user’s mobile behaviours 
can be used as the system input; the input can be one 
activity or the combination of multiple behaviours. For 
example: Wi-Fi activity from the network level. Also, the 
system can select a combination of multiple inputs; for 
example, when a user surfs the Internet, surfing features 
(explorer, web address, day and time of visiting) from the 
application level, network features (network type, number 
of data packets, and transmission rate) from the network 
level, and CPU usage from the machine level. As each 
individual user may have a different way to use the 
mobile device, therefore the system employs a Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector to choose appropriate inputs 
accordingly. The selection process is carefully considered 
and the selection criteria are defined differently for 
individual behaviour. For example, the percentage of 
unique dialled numbers: when it is bigger than the 
threshold, the calling activity will be selected; as the user 
makes a unique set of calls, it is much easier to profile the 
user’s behaviour. Another example is the frequency of 
application usage; when it is smaller than the threshold, 
that application’s features will not be used as the input; as 
if an application is not regularly used, there will not be 
enough information to help the profile building. Also, as 
the user’s behaviour may change over time, the Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector will update the input selection 
accordingly. 
 
Fig. 1. Host based multi-level behaviour profiling 
mobile IDS framework 
Following by the information provided by the Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector, the Behaviour Manager sends a 
command to the Data Collection Engine to collects the 
user behaviour features accordingly. Depending on the 
selected inputs, the Classification Engine can use various 
classification methods to compare the current activity 
against the profile: such as neural networks, fusion 
functions, and decision trees. The result will be further 
processed by the Fusion Algorithm. The Fusion 
Algorithm calculates the weight for each activity as each 
behaviour has a different impact on the decision making; 
for example, a more regular used application will have 
more weight on the decision when compared with others. 
The Behaviour Manager then sends the decision to the 
Response Mechanism, such as launching antivirus 
software, restricting access to certain applications, or even 
locking down the mobile device.  
As the Host based Multi-Level Behaviour Mobile IDS 
framework takes all the possible activities as the inputs, 
so it will provide full detection for all the mobile 
applications, the network connection and machine levels. 
Moreover, the framework will operate independently for 




It is essential that new approaches are developed to 
enable real time detection of mobile misuse on both 
known and unknown threats. Given the personal nature of 
the mobile device, behavioural profiling provides an 
opportunity to closely map an individual’s use of a 
device. The experiments have demonstrated that 
individual activities can indeed be profiled and used to 
identify legitimate and illegitimate use. 
The strength of this identification however is highly 
variable between users with some experiencing very high 
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levels of classification and others not. Given this 
variability no single technology would be stable for 
uniform deployment but rather through the utilisation of 
multiple activities within an appropriately flexible and 
robust framework, a more secure yet convenient approach 
can be realised. 
Future work will seek to identify further activities that 
can be used for classification. Focus will also be given to 
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